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Abstract: Science progresses by making contrasts, and the living world is a gold mine of
contrasts. Often disciplines become victims by focusing on too narrow a slice of that diversity,
leading to a myopic view of how nature works. The relationships between the brain and behavior
have been intensively studied in vertebrates, especially mammals, and we have become
complacent in our assumptions about how behavior is constructed. As the target article by
Mather (2019) shows, the relationship between the brain and behavior in octopuses forces us to
reevaluate some of those assumptions.
Sergio M. Pellis is a Professor of Behavioral
Neuroscience at the University of Lethbridge
whose primary research focus has been on the
mechanisms and evolution of play behavior. A
key finding has been that social play refines
executive function skills by modifying the
development of the prefrontal cortex. Website

1. Introduction. One of my favorite science fiction movies as a teenager was Howard Hawke’s
1951 classic ‘The Thing from Another World’. What I found intriguing was that the humanoidlooking invader from space was a plant. As the lead scientist states, ‘no blood in the arm, no
animal tissue at all’ and the journalist replies, ‘sounds like you are describing some form of
super carrot?’ What was most unsettling about the ‘Thing’ was that it overturned my
understanding of what it takes to behave like an animal. There are obvious mechanical problems
left unresolved by the film in how a carrot can move about without muscles and coordinate its
actions without a nervous system. But, decades later, we have come to know that plants have
some surprising capabilities in monitoring their surroundings and interacting with the world —
including ‘socially’ with other plants (e.g., Karban, 2015; Trewavas, 2015). Plants can, indeed, do
some things that were once thought to be unique to animals. It is often the juxtaposition of a
system we think we know well with one that is alien that enables us to overcome biases and see
the world from a new vantage point.
Despite the important role of cephalopods in characterizing the structure and function of
neurons (Young, 1939), much of our current understanding of the neuroscience that underlies
animal behavior is dominated by studies with vertebrates, especially mammals (Kolb &
Whishaw, 2015). Octopuses have a radically different body design — a bilaterally organized
head/body and a radially organized array of eight arms — and are capable of many of the
behaviors that are typical of vertebrates (Mather, 2019). Indeed, the body design of octopuses
gives them some unique capabilities that leave us vertebrates in awe! Juxtaposing their
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behavioral capabilities with what we know in vertebrates serves the function of the ‘Thing’ in
my own biological awakening. Only instead of coming from space, the octopus is the ‘Thing’ that
comes from our own world.
2. Centralized versus peripheral motor control. Mather’s target article shows beautifully the
many ways the unique design of octopuses affords them novel capabilities and means of
navigating the world. The feature that stood out for me was what can be achieved with a motor
system that is distributed. Vertebrate nervous systems are not as centralized as once thought.
For example, the enteric nervous system, which controls the organs of the gastrointestinal
system, has nearly as many neurons as the central nervous system and has a great deal of
autonomy in regulating the functions of those organs (Goyal & Hirano, 1996). Similarly, the
spinal cord, which is a major conduit by which the brain interacts with the rest of the body, has
considerable autonomy via local neural circuits (Stein, 1995). Much of that autonomy is greatly
restricted relative to what could be possible. Damage to the lower spinal cord of infant rats only
mildly impairs the ability of the hind legs to walk and do so in coordination with the forelimbs. In
contrast, with increasing age, the same damage can completely block spinal-generated walking.
With age, neurons from the brain gradually overtake the roles of local spinal neural circuits,
reducing intrinsic autonomous control (Stelzner, 1986). Centralization comes at the cost of
losing local autonomy.
The dual structure of the octopus nervous system, a large bilateral brain and many ganglia
distributed radially among the arms, gives these animals the best of both worlds. The brain can
set the goal, such as reaching for a crab, and the local neural circuits in the arms take care of
how to do so. As the literature reviewed by Mather shows, in some contexts, an octopus relies
on constructing motor actions built out of stereotyped components (motor primitives).
However, when challenged by contexts that require solutions that cannot rely on retooling the
available motor primitives, octopus show a remarkable ability to construct novel action
sequences. The autonomy of the arms and the limited need for sensory feedback to be
processed centrally frees octopuses to develop local solutions, and thus, novel motor patterns.
3. Conclusion. Although many of the rules that govern the construction of motor patterns in
other animals (Pellis et al., 2014) also apply to the octopus (e.g., Mather & Alupay, 2016), the
unique organization of the ‘Thing’ from beneath the seas enables an amazing degree of
behavioral flexibility. From a vertebrate perspective, these findings are a major challenge. As a
premier example of a mammal with a remarkable degree of behavioral flexibility, we humans
may feel cheated that octopuses can do so much with so little. To achieve the degree of
flexibility that we have with a much more centralized nervous system has required the addition
of much more neural tissue (Jerison, 1973). But adding neural tissue comes with higher
maintenance costs (Insler & van Schaik, 2009). Imagine what we could do with that expensive
tissue if we had a more distributed, cephalopod-like nervous system. Perhaps the next visitor
from space will show us!
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